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1. Introduction 
Buddhists accept the doctrine of non-self. Almost all Buddhists agree that selves or 
persons are unreal.1 Instead, the term “person” is merely a way of referring to a causal series of 
psychophysical elements. Nonetheless, Buddhist also claim that persons are real in a different 
sense. Persons are conventionally real. So, Buddhist philosophers deny the ultimate reality of 
persons and affirm their conventional existence.  
How is it possible for persons to exist and yet not exist? Buddhist Reductionism is an 
answer to this question. Buddhist Reductionism gives an analysis of what it means for persons to 
lack ultimate existence and retain conventional existence. Buddhist Reductionists claim that 
persons don’t belong in our final ontology. So, it’s false that persons ultimately exist. But 
persons are conventionally real in the sense that positing the existence of persons is useful. If we 
accept that persons are real, this will help us to achieve desirable outcomes, such as the 
minimization of suffering. Furthermore, Buddhist Reductionists extend their analysis to all 
composite entities, not just persons. They defend a kind of mereological nihilism according to 
which all partite entities are unreal. Buddhist Reductionists contend that the only real existents 
are particular bundles of tropes, such as color and shape. In recent years, Mark Siderits and other 
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philosophers have developed important and powerful arguments in favor of Buddhist 
Reductionism.2  
In this paper, I’ll raise an objection to Buddhist Reductionism. My objection centers on 
the nature of reasons. It seems obvious that there are reasons, such as reasons for action and 
reasons for belief. Yet I’ll show that Buddhist Reductionists are unable to adequately account for 
the existence of reasons. More precisely, I’ll argue that Buddhist Reductionists face a dilemma. 
They can understand reasons either as composite or impartite properties. If reasons are 
composite, then it’s false that reasons exist. And, if it’s false that reasons exist, then Buddhist 
Reductionism entails that there are no reasons for action or belief, including reasons to believe 
Buddhist Reductionism. Alternatively, Buddhist Reductionists can view reasons as impartite 
properties. If reasons are impartite, then reasons must be irreducible normative properties. But 
the existence of irreducible normative properties is incompatible with other important Buddhist 
commitments, such as the causal efficacy criterion of ultimate reality, nominalism about abstract 
objects, and perhaps dependent origination. So, on one horn of the dilemma, Buddhist 
Reductionism has unacceptable consequences and, on the other horn, Buddhist Reductionism 
conflicts with key Buddhist tenants. 
I’ll proceed as follows. In section 2, I’ll clarify Buddhist Reductionism. In section 3, I’ll 
lay out the dilemma for Buddhist Reductionism. I’ll then consider objections to my arguments. 
One objection holds that, even if reasons lack ultimate existence, reasons may be still be 
conventional truths. Another objection is that there’s a viable alternative understanding of value 
in the Abhidharma tradition that may escape the dilemma that I pose for Buddhist Reductionism. 
I’ll rebut these objections in section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
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2. Buddhist Reductionism 
My presentation and subsequent critique of Buddhist Reductionism will focus primarily 
on Mark Siderits’ reconstruction and defense of this view, although I will also draw on other 
philosophers who endorse components of Buddhist Reductionism.3 According to Siderits, 
Buddhist Reductionism has four major components. First, Buddhist Reductionism advances a 
theory of truth. According to this theory, there are two truths—conventional and ultimate truths. 
Some statements are conventionally true because they’re useful, and some statements are 
ultimately true because they describe what reality is like. Second, Buddhist Reductionism 
endorses mereological nihilism. Mereological nihilism says that anything that we can reduce to 
constituents lacks ultimate existence. So, all composite entities are ultimately unreal. Third, 
Buddhist Reductionists advance a specific ontology. They believe that the only irreducible 
entities are bundles of tropes, such as shape and mass. Finally, Buddhist Reductionists advance a 
distinctive kind of consequentialist ethics. I’ll now elaborate on these commitments.  
Buddhist philosophers draw a distinction between ultimate and conventional truths, and 
Buddhist Reductionists offer a distinctive analysis of these truths. Here’s their definition of 
conventional truth: a statement is conventionally true if and only if the acceptance of this 
statement reliably leads to successful practice.4 Consider the claim “the sterilization of surgical 
instruments prevents infection in patients.” This sentence is conventionally true because it helps 
us to avoid suffering. If we—and surgeons in particular—accept this statement, then surgeons 
will sterilize their instruments before surgery, and this will causes fewer patients to suffer as the 
result of infections. Thus, this statement leads to successful practice. 
 The definition of ultimate truth is: a statement is ultimately true if and only if it both 
corresponds to the facts and neither asserts nor presupposes the existence of what is not 
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ultimately real.5 Statements are ultimately true if they accurately describe what reality is really 
like. Suppose for the sake of illustration that string theory describes the fundamental structure of 
reality. If so, then everything is composed of one-dimensional vibrating strings. Statements about 
these strings can be ultimately true. After all, if infinitesimal strings are the deepest nature of 
reality, then statements about these strings may correspond to the facts and refrain from asserting 
the existence of things that are unreal. 
 The second major feature of Buddhist Reductionism is mereological nihilism. 
Mereological nihilism says that only impartite entities are ultimately real, and that composite 
entities are unreal. So, anything that we can reduce to more fundamental constituents doesn’t 
exist. For example, cars are composite entities. Cars are composed of engines, fuel tanks, wheels, 
and so on. So, it’s false that cars belong in our final ontology because they’re partite. Cars lack 
reality above and beyond the individual parts that make them up. 
Buddhists extend mereological nihilism to persons. Persons are composed of mental and 
physical states, such bodies, consciousness, and mental formations. If persons are composite 
entities, it follows that persons lack existence from the perspective of ultimate reality. The 
dialogue Milinda Pañha is an influential statement of this view. In this dialogue with the Indo-
Greek king of Bactria, the Buddhist monk Nāgasena denies that he exists. He says that 
“Nāgasena’ exists as a mere designation. However, in the ultimate sense there is no person as 
such that is found.”6 Nāgasena’s reasoning is that he’s a partite entity composed of material form 
and mental states and thus cannot exist. Nāgasena’s argument depends on the view that 
composite entities are unreal. 
 But why should we accept mereological nihilism? Buddhist Reductionists offer different 
arguments for this position. One of the most influential is the neither-identical-nor-distinct 
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argument. The argument goes like this. If wholes exist, then either wholes are identical with their 
parts or distinct from them. To take Nāgasena’s example, if a chariot exists as a whole, then it’s 
either identical with the components that make it up (the spokes, wheels, etc) or distinct from 
these components. It’s impossible for the whole and the parts to be identical because they have 
different properties. The parts are many and the whole is one. Assuming the indiscernibility of 
identicals, the parts and the whole can’t be identical. Is the whole distinct from its parts? This 
seems false because the whole gains all of its causal powers from the parts. If the whole gains all 
of its causal powers from the parts, then we can explain the whole entirely in terms of its parts. 
Entities that can be entirely explained in terms of facts about their constituent parts are not 
distinct from their parts. Therefore, the whole is neither identical with nor distinct from its parts. 
We can conclude that wholes don’t exist. 
 There are other arguments for mereological nihilism, but they’re not important to my 
argument in this paper and so I’ll put them to one side for now. Let’s move on to the final major 
component of Buddhist Reductionism: Abhidharma metaphysics. Buddhists in the Abhidharma 
tradition hold that the fundamental constituents of reality are dharmas. According to one 
plausible interpretation, dharmas are tropes.7 Tropes are features of particular entities. Tropes are 
things like the color, shape, or texture of an object. Tropes aren’t universals. Rather, they’re 
properties that are located in a particular place and time. What we call “universals” are just 
aggregations of particular tropes or dharmas. According to many Abhidharma philosophers, 
dharmas are also momentary. While dharmas exist for a time, they rapidly disappear. Finally, 
dharmas are impartite and simple. We’re unable to reduce them to more fundamental properties. 
So, Abhidharma philosophers think that objects are composed of bundles of impartite dharmas. 
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When combined with mereological nihilism, the upshot is that the world we know is illusory. 
Reality in fact consists in an everchanging succession of dharmas. 
Furthermore, Buddhist Reductionism accepts a causal criterion of existence. According to 
Siderits’ reconstruction, Buddhist Reductionists believe that only entities that have causal 
properties can exist. One of the most influential formulations of the causal efficacy criterion is 
Dharmakīrti’s claim that “whatever has the capacity for causal efficacy is ultimately existent; 
everything else is just conventionally existent.”8 Siderits affirms this causal efficacy criterion. 
Siderits says that “Buddhist Reductionism…relies on the causal efficacy criterion for real 
entities” and that “the pan-Buddhist position [is] that causal efficacy is the mark of the ultimately 
real.”9 If the causal efficacy criterion is correct, then properties must have causal powers in order 
to be ultimately real. In this respect, Siderits’ Buddhist Reductionism is similar to the 
Sarvāstivāda school of Abhidharma. The Sarvāstivāda school holds that dharmas are the 
fundamental constituents of reality, that dharmas are momentary, and that causal efficacy is the 
primary criterion of existence.10 Siderits’ version of Buddhist Reductionism seems to endorse 
these commitments as well. 
 Now that I’ve sketched out some of the main contours of Buddhist Reductionism, let’s 
return to the Buddhist analysis of persons. Remember that Buddhist Reductionists believe that 
persons are ultimately unreal and conventionally existent. I’ve already explained why Buddhist 
Reductionists deny that persons exist: persons are composite entities and therefore can’t be real 
from an ultimate perspective. But Buddhist Reductionists say that persons are conventionally 
real. Why? Buddhist Reductionists think that accepting that persons exist is useful. In particular, 
accepting that there are persons minimizes suffering better than other possible conventions. So, 
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statements about persons can be conventionally true because positing the existence of persons 
promotes good consequences. 
Siderits gives the following illustration.11 We teach children to care about their futures, 
even when they’re disinclined to care. For example, we try to get our children to brush their 
teeth, eat their vegetables, and study for their next spelling test, despite the fact that they find all 
of these activities to be unpleasant. In doing this, we encourage children to identify with their 
pasts and futures and conceive of themselves as enduring entities with prudential interests. This 
habituation is useful because it reduces pain on net. There will be fewer toothaches if children 
brush their teeth. More generally, there will be less suffering if we identify with our futures and 
seek to avoid painful outcomes. In this respect, the personhood convention is helpful.  
Here’s another illustration, again from Siderits.12 If persons lack reality, then no one can 
deserve anything. Desert seems to be a property that only persons could possess. After all, you 
and I don’t deserve anything if we don’t exist. Nonetheless, it’s a good thing that judges treat 
murderers as if they were deserving of punishment. This is so because punishing murderers 
reduces suffering overall by deterring future murders. Thus, treating murderers as if they were 
persons promotes utility and helps explain why the personhood convention is justified.  
Siderits contends that we should adopt the personhood convention because this 
minimizes suffering overall. But why should we aim to minimize suffering overall? Here Siderits 
and other Buddhist Reductionists invoke Śāntideva’s argument in Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra.13 
Śāntideva says that a person is an aggregate of psychophysical constituents, similar to how an 
army is an aggregate of soldiers. Along with Buddhists in the Abhidharma tradition, Śāntideva 
suggests that aggregates are unreal. Since persons are aggregates of psychophysical constituents, 
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they’re unreal as well. If persons are unreal, it’s false that we should only minimize our own 
suffering. We should reduce suffering irrespective of its location. 
 We can break down this interpretation of Śāntideva’s argument as follows: 
1. There are reasons to minimize suffering in my own life. 
2. Persons ultimately don’t exist. 
3. If there are reasons to minimize suffering in my own life and persons ultimately don’t 
exist, then there are reasons to minimize suffering irrespective of the location of this 
suffering. 
4. So, there are reasons to minimize suffering irrespective of its location. 
Premise 1 holds that we should reduce our own suffering. Everyone agrees that we should 
prevent our own suffering. Moreover, Śāntideva suggests that we’re rationally required to 
minimize suffering on net. He writes: “All doctors use painful treatments to restore health. It 
follows that to put an end to many sufferings, a slight one must be endured.”14 By the same logic, 
we should minimize sufferings on balance within our lives.  
Premise 2 is an affirmation of the Buddhist doctrine of non-self, which I have already 
discussed. Premise 3 is the conditional claim that, if there are reasons to minimize suffering in 
my own life and persons ultimately don’t exist, then there are reasons to minimize suffering 
irrespective of the location of this suffering. The motivation for this premise is that we lack 
grounds for prioritizing the reduction of our own suffering if persons are unreal. If persons are 
unreal, then the fact that suffering is yours and not mine is irrelevant because ultimately there’s 
no such thing yours and mine. There are just pains, and, if pains are to be minimized, then they 
must be minimized regardless of where they occur.  
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Siderits and other authors like Charles Goodman who are sympathetic to Buddhist 
Reductionism endorse this argument for minimizing suffering. This argument supports a kind of 
Buddhist consequentialism. Siderits remarks: “welfare is constituted by purely impersonal states 
and events, and that it is these that ought to be considered in determining what to do.”15 This 
consequentialist moral theory justifies the personhood convention. We ought to reduce suffering 
overall. According to Siderits, the best way to reduce suffering overall is to conceive of 
ourselves to be persons. For sure, Siderits maintains that we should deviate from the personhood 
convention when this would produce superior impersonal outcomes. But, for the most part, it’s a 
good thing for us to think of ourselves as persons.  
This completes my description of Buddhist Reductionism. I’ll now develop an objection 
to it.  
 
3. The Dilemma 
My objection to Buddhist Reductionism centers on the nature of reasons. Reasons are 
considerations that count in favor of A doing X. We think that we have reasons for action, 
reasons for belief, reasons for attitudes, and so on. For example, you might think: 
(i) The fact that some action would promote your survival is a reason to do it.  
(ii) The fact that some statement is true is a reason to believe it. 
(iii) The fact that someone is altruistic is a reason to admire this person.16  
Claims (i-iii) seem plausible. Buddhist Reductionists also agree that there are reasons. In 
particular, they claim: 
(iv) The fact that some action would minimize suffering on net is a reason to do it. 
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But can Buddhist Reductionists make sense of reasons? How do reasons fit into Buddhist 
ontology? 
Buddhist Reductionists have two ways of understanding the nature of reasons: either (a) 
reasons are composite or (b) these reasons are irreducible and impartite. Either option leads us 
into trouble. If we assume (a), then it turns out that reasons are unreal. If we opt for (b), then 
Buddhist Reductionism contradicts fundamental Buddhist commitments. So, both options for 
Buddhist Reductionism have unacceptable implications. Let me now explain the horns of this 
dilemma in detail. 
 
A. Reasons are Composites 
Let’s start with the first option, the position that reasons are composites. How can reasons 
be composites?  
A Humean analysis of reasons illustrates how it’s possible for reasons to be composites.17 
This account holds that psychological states, such as desires, explain reasons. More specifically, 
a Humean theory of reasons relies on the idea of constitutive explanations. Consider an analogy. 
A triangle is a composite entity. A triangle is constituted by three lines arranged in a certain way. 
The arrangements of lines explains what it is for something to be a triangle. Something is a 
triangle because it has three sides. Similarly, a Humean theory of reasons holds that reasons are 
constituted by psychological states. To have a reason to perform some action just is to have a 
psychological state that disposes you to perform this action under the right conditions.  
Here’s an illustration. Suppose that Sam has a reason to go to a party at his friend’s 
house.18 The explanation for this reason is that Sam has a desire to go to the party if he thinks it 
will be fun. Sam believes that the party tonight will be fun. Thus, he has a reason to go to the 
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party. Sam’s desires and beliefs about the party just are what it is for Sam to have a reason to 
attend the party. Sam’s psychological states are constitutive of his reasons. Consider also our 
reasons to reduce suffering. A Humean might say that our reasons to minimize suffering are 
constituted by our psychological disposition to avoid suffering under certain circumstances. In 
this way, we can decompose reasons into more fundamental constituents—a person’s 
psychological states. A Humean theory is a reductive theory of reasons: it says that we can 
reduce reasons to non-normative properties.  
Notice that reasons are partite on the Humean account. Reasons have constituents: 
psychological states. However, Buddhist Reductionism is committed to mereological nihilism. 
Mereological nihilism says that there are no composite or partite entities. It’s false that there are 
chariots. There are only a collection of wheels, spokes, carriages, and other components that we 
group together for our own purposes. The only things that exist are simple and impartite 
dharmas. Mereological nihilism is crucial to Buddhist Reductionism because it underwrites the 
rejection of selves and persons. As persons are partite, they lack existence. Yet, if mereological 
nihilism is a claim about the metaphysical status of all composite entities, then it should apply to 
reasons too. So, if composite entities are unreal and reasons are composite, then reasons are 
unreal. Reasons are mere conceptual constructions.  
The unreality of reasons raises serious problems for Buddhist Reductionism. If reasons 
don’t exist, then Buddhist Reductionists may need to jettison their ethical commitments. 
Buddhist Reductionism depends on the view that there are reasons to reduce suffering. But, if 
there are no reasons, then there are no reasons to minimize suffering or bring about other good 
outcomes. Buddhist Reductionists believe that persons are conventionally real because the 
personhood convention brings about desirable outcomes. Yet, without reasons to bring about 
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good outcomes, there is no reason to affirm the reality of persons. The result is that Buddhist 
Reductionism collapses into eliminativism about persons, the view that persons are entirely 
unreal.  
Many philosophers think that the Humean analysis of reasons applies to reasons for 
action. Sam has a reason to go the party because he has a desire to do so. Yet some philosophers 
believe that we can give all reasons a Humean analysis, including epistemic reasons for belief. 
Sharon Street holds this view.19 She thinks that epistemic reasons depend on our attitudes. We 
have reasons to believe true propositions only because we have practical reasons to engage in the 
“belief business.” The belief business is the project of determining whether our beliefs are true or 
false. So, our epistemic reasons depend on our practical reasons. For example, we have reason to 
believe the truth about whether there’s a tiger in the bush next to us because we have a reason to 
avoid being eaten. Our practical reasons, like our reason to escape being eaten, are the reasons to 
form true beliefs about tigers. But Street argues that our practical reasons are dependent on our 
attitudes. Practical reasons are constructed out of, or constituted by, these attitudes. If epistemic 
reasons depend on practical reasons and practical reasons are attitude-dependent, then epistemic 
reasons are attitude-dependent as well. 
Suppose that Street is right that epistemic reasons depend on, or are constructed out of, 
psychological states. Thus, if mereological nihilism is true, then there are no reasons for belief, 
as reasons for belief are constituted by attitudes. If there are no reasons—including epistemic 
reasons—then we lack reasons to believe Buddhist Reductionism. This seems like a problematic 
result. Consider an analogy. Suppose that I made the following two claims:  
(1) It’s definitely raining outside. 
(2) I have absolutely no reason at all to believe that it’s raining outside.  
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There’s something wrong with the conjunction of these two statements. The problem is that (2) 
undermines any reason to endorse (1). Similarly, my argument suggests that Buddhist 
Reductionists are committed to the conjunction of the following claims: 
(3) Buddhist Reductionism is true. 
(4) There is no reason to believe Buddhist Reductionism. 
Claim (4) undermines our reasons for believing (3). Buddhist Reductionism entails that we lack 
any reason believe it. In this respect, Buddhist Reductionism seems self-defeating.20 
Maybe Buddhist Reductionists can somehow avoid global skepticism about reasons. 
Some error theorists about normativity try to drive a wedge between normative reasons and 
epistemic reasons. These error theorists deny that epistemic reasons are normative. Instead, 
reasons for belief are merely descriptive statements.21 Suppose that these error theorists are right. 
Perhaps we can then restrict skepticism about normativity to reasons for action and exempt 
reasons for belief. That would still be bad news for Buddhist Reductionists. This skepticism 
would undercut the ethical component of Buddhist Reductionism and the conventional existence 
of persons. So, if we consider reasons to be composites, then Buddhist Reductionists must 
jettison at least some of their core commitments.22 
 
B. Reasons are Impartite 
Let’s now consider the other horn of the dilemma. Recall that there are two options for 
Buddhist Reductionists: they can believe that reasons are composite or impartite. Let’s now 
consider the second option, the view that reasons are impartite. If reasons are impartite, then they 
are irreducible. We can’t decompose reasons into more fundamental constituents. Why? 
Buddhist Reductionists say that anything that’s reducible to some other properties must be 
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composite in nature. And anything that’s impartite is irreducible. It follows then that impartite 
reasons are irreducible properties. Reasons are among the fundamental constituents of the world, 
along with tropes like color, mass, and shape. 
This understanding of reasons has something in common with contemporary non-
naturalism about reasons. Derek Parfit, Thomas Scanlon, and other philosophers contend that 
reasons are irreducible normative truths.23 Consider the claim that there are reasons to minimize 
suffering. Non-naturalists would say that these reasons are irreducible. The reasons to minimize 
suffering are not identical with or reducible to non-normative statements, such as the fact that I 
have a desire to avoid suffering. It’s also false that reasons are constructed out of, or constituted 
by, other properties. Rather, reasons are sui generis normative properties. Scanlon puts the point 
as follows: 
…truths about reasons are fundamental in the sense that truths about reasons are not 
reducible to or identifiable with non-normative truths, such as truths about the natural 
world of physical objects, causes and effects, nor can they be explained in terms of 
notions of rationality or rational agency that are not themselves claims about reasons.24 
Non-naturalism about reasons and the view that reasons are impartite share the implication that 
reasons are irreducible properties. So, if we think that reasons are impartite, then, surprisingly, it 
seems that Buddhist Reductionists must be committed to something like non-naturalism about 
reasons. 
 Here’s a problem though: it’s unclear whether the view that reasons are irreducible 
normative properties is consistent with other Buddhist commitments. The issue is that, if reasons 
are irreducible normative properties, then it seems false that they have causal powers. The claim 
that irreducible normative properties lack causal efficacy is the standard view among 
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contemporary non-naturalists. Parfit writes: “[w]hen some fact gives us a reason to have some 
belief, this normative property of being reason-giving is not an empirically discoverable feature 
of the natural world. Nor could we be causally affected by such normative properties.”25 David 
Enoch contends that basic “normative truths are causally inert.”26 Scanlon, Thomas Nagel, and 
other non-naturalists agree that irreducible normative properties don’t have causal powers.27 
Why should we believe that irreducible normative properties lack causal efficacy? To 
motivate this commitment, notice that reductionist theories of reason are unable to justify the 
view that normative truths are independent of our attitudes and judgments. Consider ideally 
coherent malevolence. Let’s imagine a person who has the sole aim of maximizing the suffering 
of others. And assume that this malevolent person is entirely coherent. Even if this evildoer had 
full information and his beliefs and attitudes were completely consistent, he would desire to 
inflict suffering on others. Does this evildoer have normative reason to maximize suffering? If 
our normative reasons are a function of our attitudes or desires, then this evildoer seems to have 
decisive normative reason to inflict suffering. This result is counterintuitive to many of us. Yet 
non-naturalists can say that the coherent evildoer is making a mistake. They can claim that, 
irrespective of what your desires and attitudes are like, the stance-independent truth is that you 
don’t have normative reasons to maximize the suffering of others.28 
We can now see one reason why non-naturalists are led to conclude that normative 
properties lack casual powers. If natural properties were causally or constitutively responsible for 
normative truths, then normative truths would depend on the natural ones, like an agent’s 
attitudes, desires, or judgments. And these commitments rule out the stance-independence of 
normative truths. Non-naturalists have other reasons for rejecting the causal efficacy of 
normative properties as well. Non-naturalists argue that we’re unable to reduce the meaning of 
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normative claims to statements about causally efficacious natural properties.29 On their view, the 
claim that “I have a normative reason in favor of performing action X” contains information 
that’s absent in the claim that “I have a desire to perform action X” or other similar claims about 
natural properties in the world. Non-naturalists contend that natural and normative properties are 
simply too different for naturalistic analyses of normative properties to be successful. 
Let’s suppose that contemporary non-naturalists are right that irreducible normative 
properties lack causal powers. This implies that Buddhist Reductionism and non-naturalism 
about normativity are incompatible. Recall that Siderits accepts a causal efficacy criterion of 
existence. A causal efficacy criterion of existence holds that only properties or entities that have 
causal powers are part of ultimate reality. A range of other Buddhist philosophers endorse this 
view as well. For example, in explaining why Buddhists reject the existence of universals, Jay 
Garfield remarks: “Since universals are abstracta, and hence both causally inert and permanent, 
they fail to satisfy the most fundamental Buddhist criteria for reality—causal interdependence 
and spatio-temporal locality.”30 This causal efficacy criterion seems compatible with a 
reductionist account of reasons. If reasons were reducible to desires and attitudes, then they 
would be part of the causal fabric of the universe. After all, desires and attitudes are part of the 
causal nexus. But are irreducible normative properties consistent with the causal efficacy 
criterion? It looks like the answer to this question is “no.” Only properties with causal powers 
belong in our final ontology. Yet irreducible normative properties lack causal efficacy. Thus, if 
irreducible normative properties are real, then the causal efficacy criterion is false.   
You might think that a Buddhist Reductionist should jettison the causal efficacy criterion, 
especially if the alternative is to deny the existence of reasons altogether. The problem is that, if 
Buddhist Reductionists affirm the existence of irreducible normative reasons, this also puts 
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pressure on other, related Buddhist commitments. For example, the causal efficacy criterion 
appears to be conceptually related to the doctrine of dependent origination. One prominent 
interpretation of dependent origination is that everything has a casual explanation, and, 
moreover, that all entities are subject to origination, duration, and cessation.31 All entities are 
impermanent and caught in a chain of causation, and there is no reality above and beyond the 
causal web. This interpretation of dependent origination suggests that all that exists has a causal 
backstory. If so, then dependent origination and the causal efficacy criterion are similar or 
perhaps even equivalent ideas.  
Most Buddhist philosophers are also nominalists. They deny the existence of universals 
in part because universals are causally impotent. Universals are eternal and unchanging entities. 
Eternal and unchanging objects lack the power to produce causal effects at particular times. If the 
criterion that distinguishes what’s real from what’s merely conventional is causal efficacy, then 
universals are unreal. But, if irreducible normative reasons exists, then why not universals too? 
Both are causally inert. Thus, if normative properties are real, then it’s hard to see why we 
should deny the existence of universals and other abstract objects.  
Contemporary philosophers often object to non-naturalism about reasons on 
epistemological grounds. They ask how we could come to acquire knowledge about irreducible 
normative properties. Ordinarily, we gain knowledge through causal interaction. Imagine that I 
claim that my dishwasher is broken. How do I know this? Well, I causally interacted with my 
dishwasher in various ways. Perhaps I tried to start it up, but it didn’t work. Or I examined it 
closely and noticed some of the machinery was damaged. Even abstruse scientific knowledge 
depends on causal interactions. We can understand the properties of black holes and electrons 
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because they affect our environment.32 But irreducible normative truths are causally 
inefficacious. We can’t see or touch them. So, how then can we possibly know about them?  
This objection to abstract objects dependents on the causal theory of knowledge. 
According to this theory, knowledge requires a causal link between the knower and the object of 
knowledge. Many Buddhist epistemologists endorse a causal theory of knowledge. For instance, 
Dharmakīrti claims that we acquire knowledge of the world by causally interacting with it. 
Dharmakīrti says that “that is perceptible which causes the content of awareness to track its own 
presence and absence.”33 Our environment causes perceptual awareness of unique particulars, 
and this is how we gain knowledge of them. The only other epistemic instrument is inference and 
inference is only reliable insofar as it depends on perception.34   
This suggests another problem with irreducible normative properties. If Buddhists are 
committed to a causal theory of knowledge, then it’s mysterious how they can make sense of 
knowledge of reasons. Buddhist epistemology arguably lacks the resources to explain how we 
can acquire knowledge of normativity. So, if there are irreducible normative reasons and we have 
knowledge of them, then at least some Buddhists must jettison their theory of knowledge. 
Alternatively, suppose that Buddhists want to retain their theory of knowledge. Buddhists thus 
seem to committed to epistemic skepticism about reasons. There seems to be no way that we 
could come to possess knowledge of causally inert properties. 
I won’t continue belaboring the point. The view that reasons are impartite and irreducible 
is incompatible with central Buddhist philosophical commitments. If Buddhist Reductionists are 
committed to the existence of irreducible normative properties, then they must reject these 
commitments. Perhaps other kinds of reductionists can reply: “so much the worse for 
Buddhism!” But this response is unavailable to Buddhist Reductionists. At the very least, 
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Buddhist Reductionist have compelling reasons to refrain from claiming that reasons are 
irreducible.  
 
C. Summary 
This completes my initial presentation of a dilemma for Buddhist Reductionism. To 
recap, my argument goes like this: 
1. Buddhist Reductionists must accept either that normative reasons are composite or 
impartite.  
2. If reasons are composite, then reasons ultimately don’t exist. 
3. If reasons ultimately don’t exist, then ultimately there are no reasons to reduce suffering, 
affirm the conventional existence of persons, and (perhaps) believe Buddhist 
Reductionism. 
4. If reasons are impartite, then the causal efficacy criterion of ultimate existence, 
nominalism, and other important Buddhist doctrines are false.  
5. So, either Buddhist Reductionist must either (a) accept that ultimately there are no 
reasons to reduce suffering, affirm the conventional existence of persons, and believe 
Buddhist Reductionism, or (b) conclude that key Buddhist commitments are false. 
I’ll now consider how Buddhist Reductionists might respond to my argument.  
 
4. Objections and Responses 
A. Are Reasons Conventional? 
My argument against Buddhist Reductionism takes the form of a dilemma. If we opt for 
either of the two options available to Buddhist Reductionists, then we run into trouble. But what 
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if there’s a third option? One possible third option is that reasons are conventional. Buddhist 
Reductionists can claim that, while reasons ultimately don’t exist, they have a conventional 
existence. In a footnote, Siderits suggests this response. He writes: “it could be argued that the 
notion of a reason for action is unavailable at [the level of ultimate reality] – that reasons are the 
sorts of things that only persons could be said to have.”35 Of course, Siderits denies the reality of 
persons. So, it seems that he’s committed to the conclusion that reasons don’t ultimately exist. 
But Siderits adds that “facts at the ultimate level explain how it comes to be conventionally true 
that we have reasons for action.”  
Siderits seems to be claiming:  
(5) Reasons don’t exist at the ultimate level of reality. 
(6) Reasons exist conventionally. 
Now, what does (6) mean? Remember that Siderits defines conventional truth as follows: “A 
sentence is said to be conventionally true if and only if it reliably leads to successful practice.” 
Siderits suggests that a statement is conventionally true if the acceptance of this statement helps 
us to achieve good outcomes, such as the reduction of suffering. Suppose that we adopt this 
analysis of conventional truth. We can then interpret (6) as equivalent to: 
(7) Accepting that there are reasons reliably leads to successful practice.  
It’s an interesting question why accepting that reasons exist would promote desirable outcomes, 
but let’s suppose for the moment that it would. So, the claim that there are reasons would be 
conventionally true.36 
 But there’s a problem with the view that reasons are merely conventional. To see why, 
consider the conventional existence of persons. Buddhist Reductionists claim that we should 
accept the personhood convention because doing so reduces suffering. Now, suppose that you 
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ask: “why should I minimize suffering?” At first glance, the only viable answer to this question 
invokes reasons. An answer to this question must give you with a good reason to reduce 
suffering. The content of these reasons can vary. But consider some possibilities. Someone might 
argue that you have reason to minimize suffering because every rational being desires these 
outcomes. Or perhaps that facilitating these outcomes is in your self-interest. Maybe God 
commands you to alleviate suffering. Or suffering is intrinsically bad and that’s a reason to 
reduce it. We can give other explanations for why you could have reasons to minimize suffering 
as well.  
So, an acceptable answer to the question “why should I minimize suffering?” is that you 
have good reasons to minimize suffering. Yet we can now ask: “why should I believe the 
statement ‘there is good reason to minimize suffering on net?’” Suppose that the statement “there 
is good reason to minimize suffering on net” is a conventional truth. If this statement is a 
conventional truth, then you should accept this statement because doing so would minimize 
suffering. But notice that we’ve now gone in a circle. This chain of reasoning is in effect 
claiming: 
(8) You have reasons to minimize suffering on net because accepting that you have 
reasons to minimize suffering on net would minimize suffering on net. 
Something has gone wrong here. What exactly? 
Consider an analogy. Suppose that I was trying to persuade you to take up tennis. Here’s 
my argument:  
(9) You have reasons to play tennis because accepting that you have reasons to play 
tennis would cause you to play tennis. 
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This is a bad argument. Why? It begs the question. Claim (9) presupposes that playing tennis is 
valuable, but it gives no independent reason why this is so. A better argument for playing tennis 
would give independent reasons in favor of playing tennis. For example, you might claim that 
playing tennis is fun, it’s good for your health, and so on. Now take (8). Claim (8) also begs the 
question. (8) presupposes that reducing suffering is valuable. But (8) fails to provide us with any 
independent reasons to believe that this is the case.  
 So, there seems to be something wrong with understanding reasons in terms of 
conventional truths. Here’s my diagnosis of the problem. Conventional truths are instrumental to 
desirable ends, such as happiness, virtue, or reducing suffering. In other words, conventional 
truths are instrumentally valuable. They help us to achieve our goals. But something that’s only 
instrumentally valuable must be a means to something else that’s intrinsically valuable. If that 
weren’t the case, then it would be false that this thing has instrumentally value. So, we need 
some reason to believe that the end that justifies conventional truths is intrinsically valuable. And 
this reason can’t be a conventional truth. If this reason is merely conventional, then it would beg 
the question in the same way that (8) and (9) beg the question. Another way to put the point is 
that conventional reasons are only instrumental reasons. For instrumental reasons to have weight, 
they must depend on intrinsic reasons. Otherwise, there would be an infinite regress of value. 
Thus, conventional truths must bottom out in intrinsic values or reasons.  
Let’s return to the question: why should we reduce suffering? To answer this question, 
we must give reasons why should we reduce suffering and these reasons must, at some point, be 
intrinsic reasons, reasons why it’s in itself valuable to reduce suffering. Notice that, to avoid 
begging the question, these reasons why reducing suffering is valuable can’t be conventional 
because conventional reasons are instrumental. The only remaining possibility is that these 
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reasons are ultimate reasons, reasons that exist from the perspective of ultimate reality. However, 
if conventional truths rest on ultimate reasons, then Buddhist Reductionists are unable to escape 
the dilemma that I’ve laid out. They must still give an analysis of ultimate reasons. If these 
reasons are partite, then they lack ultimate existence. And, if they are impartite, then they 
conflict with core Buddhist commitments. 
Let me summarize where the dialectic stands. If truths about reasons were conventional, 
then Buddhist Reductionists could accept that there are no reasons from the perspective of 
ultimate truth. So, they could embrace the first horn of the dilemma. Yet Buddhist Reductionists 
could argue that we still have conventional reasons for action. They could then claim that we can 
understand their account in terms of conventional reasons. This would mitigate the damage from 
conceding that there are ultimately no reasons. On this view, although there are no ultimate 
reasons, we have conventional reasons to minimize suffering and conventional reasons to affirm 
the existence of persons. I’ve shown that this path is unavailable to Buddhist Reductionists. We 
can’t understand reasons in terms of conventional truths in a non-question-begging way. As a 
result, the dilemma for Buddhist Reductionism remains intact.37 
 
B. Help from Abhidharma Metaphysics? 
In this subsection, I want to consider the possibility that there’s an alternative 
understanding of value in the Buddhist tradition that can avoid the dilemma that I’ve set out. 
This understanding comes from the Abhidharma tradition. As I noted in section 2, Abhidharma 
metaphysics holds that ultimate reality consists in dharmas, which we might describe as tropes. 
Some of these dharmas are mental factors and includes elements like greed, hatred, joy, and 
compassion. Abhidharma philosophers claim that mental dharmas have normative valences. 
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Certain mental dharmas are good or wholesome (kusala), while other dharmas are bad or 
unwholesome (akusala), and still others are neutral (abyākata). Mental dharmas are good or bad 
in virtue of the fact that their ultimate valences are good or bad, and not because we judge them 
to be so. In addition, facts about the valence of dharmas are ultimate truths rather than 
conventional ones. Thus, Abhidharma treats goodness and badness as fundamental constituents 
of reality. 
The Abhidharma philosophers seem to have thought that the normative valence of a 
dharma is not distinct from the dharma itself. Rather, to experience the dharma fully and clearly 
just is to see it as wholesome, neutral, or unwholesome. Unwholesome dharmas such as anger 
and hatred produce disturbances in the mind and aversive reactions. In contrast, wholesome 
dharmas like compassion and loving-kindness are calming and bring ease to the mind. By 
carefully attending to the nature of experience, we can determine the valence of mental dharmas. 
Perhaps Abhidharma philosophers were proposing a kind of non-inferential normative 
knowledge. We acquire knowledge of the normative charge of mental dharmas by skillfully 
experiencing or observing them, which may require meditation practice.38 
My dilemma in this paper assumes that there are two kinds of theories of normative 
reasons on offer: reductionist theories and non-naturalist ones. But perhaps Buddhist 
Reductionists can propose another understanding of value that draws on the Abhidharma 
tradition, or another version of non-naturalism or reductionism that avoids the dilemma that I’ve 
proposed. Buddhist Reductionism is arguably committed to something like Abhidharma 
metaphysics, at least according to Siderits’ interpretation. So, it’s worth examining whether 
Buddhist Reductionists can rely on Abhidharma metaphysics to formulate a viable alternative to 
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reductionist and non-naturalist theories. If that project succeeds, then the dilemma that I’ve 
sketched out is a false one. It turns out that there’s another option on the table. 
But does the Abhidharma position present a genuine alternative to reductionist and non-
naturalist understandings of normativity? This is unclear. To see the difficulty with this 
suggestion, let’s assume along with Abhidharma philosophers that mental dharmas are valenced 
as good, bad, or neutral. That’s not enough to get us normative reasons. We also need an account 
of how the goodness and badness of mental dharmas link up with, or generate, these reasons. We 
use the terms “good” and “bad” in different ways and sometimes these usages don’t imply 
anything about reasons. Suppose I say of the coat that I’m wearing: “this is a good coat.” When I 
say this, I just mean that this coat satisfies certain standards, like keeping me warm. By itself, 
this meaning fails to imply any commitments about the reasons that I have. At first glance, the 
same point could apply to dharmas. Even if we grant that some dharmas are fundamentally good 
or bad, we need to say more to specify what this implies for the reasons that we have with 
respect to these dharmas. 
To bridge the gap between goodness and badness and normative reasons, we need to use 
the terms “good” and “bad” in a reason-implying sense. When we say that something is good or 
bad in a reason-implying sense, we mean that there are facts about this thing’s nature that give us 
reasons to respond to this thing in a certain way.39 Suppose that you believe that happiness is 
good and pain is bad in a reason-implying sense. If so, you likely believe that you have reasons 
to bring about more happiness in your life and reasons to minimize the amount of pain in it. Let’s 
assume that mental dharmas are good or bad in a reason-implying sense. The fact that a dharma 
is wholesome is presumably a reason to bring similar dharmas about in the future or the fact that 
a dharma is bad is a reason to prevent similar mental dharmas from arising. 
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But then we need to ask: what’s the nature of the reasons to bring about good dharmas or 
prevent bad or unwholesome ones? We must now furnish an account of these normative reasons. 
Let’s consider pain as an illustration. Most people agree that we have reason to reduce pain. Why 
though? Some non-naturalists say that we have reasons to reduce pain irrespective of the 
judgments that an agent has toward her pain.40 The reasons to minimize pain are irreducible 
normative properties. Notice that, on this view, your attitudes and beliefs toward pain can be 
mistaken. Suppose you thought, strangely, you should increase the amount of pain in your life, 
even though this isn’t necessary to achieve any other good. Well, you’d be wrong. Furthermore, 
your reasons to avoid pain would not be caused by your attitudes and judgments because 
normative truths are independent of your attitudes. But, if we go this route, we run into the same 
problems that confront any attempt to reconcile Buddhist Reductionism with non-naturalism. 
We’d need to reject the causal efficacy criterion of ultimate existence and other associated 
commitments.  
Yet that’s not the only theory of the reason-giving badness of pain on offer. There’s an 
alternative, attitude-dependent theory.41 This account says that we have reasons to minimize pain 
in virtue of the fact that we have some desire to avoid pain or some judgment that counts against 
experiencing pain. This would be a reductionist account. Our reasons to minimize pain are 
constructed out of psychological states. Once again though, we run into the same troubles that 
beset attempts to marry reductionist accounts of reasons with Buddhist Reductionism. If reasons 
are composites of non-normative properties and composite entities are ultimately unreal, then 
we’d have to deny that reasons are ultimately real as well. It seems that we can run through this 
same exercise with any mental dharmas that Buddhist Reductionists propose.  
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So, it’s unclear whether Buddhist Reductionists can offer a viable understanding of 
normativity that escapes the dilemma that I’ve laid out. Abhidharma metaphysics presents us 
with a fascinating and suggestive understanding of how normative valences can exist as 
fundamental constituents of reality. Yet, even if we accept this picture of the world, we must still 
give an account of our reasons to respond to wholesome or unwholesome dharmas in any 
particular way. That’s where the dilemma I’ve sketched comes back into play. Unless we can 
figure out a viable alternative to the reductionist and non-naturalist theories of reasons, the 
dilemma for Buddhist Reductionists retains its force. And there’s some ground for doubting that 
Abhidharma philosophy provides us with this alternative. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Can Buddhist philosophy make sense of reasons? In this paper, I’ve examined whether 
one important Buddhist view—Buddhist Reductionism—has the resources to justify the 
existence of reasons. My diagnosis is pessimistic. I’ve argued that Buddhist Reductionism lacks 
the resources to make sense of reasons and, furthermore, that this failure casts doubt on the 
plausibility of Buddhist Reductionism as a whole. If my argument in this paper is correct, then 
Buddhist Reductionists face a stark choice. They must either endorse skepticism about normative 
reasons or reject key Buddhist commitments. Neither option is appealing. If nothing else, this 
conclusion suggests that Buddhist philosophers have more work to do in clarifying how reasons 
fit into their ontologies. 
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